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Abstract 
We present a form of soft paternalism called “autonomy-enhancing paternalism” that seeks to in-
crease individual well-being by facilitating the individual ability to make critically reflected, au-
tonomous decisions. The focus of autonomy-enhancing paternalism is on helping individuals to 
become better decision-makers, rather than on helping them by making better decisions for them. 
Autonomy-enhancing paternalism acknowledges that behavioral interventions can change the 
strength of decision-making anomalies over time, and favors those interventions that improve, ra-
ther than reduce, individuals’ ability to make good and unbiased decisions. By this it prevents ma-
nipulation of the individual by the soft paternalist, accounts for the heterogeneity of individuals, 
and counteracts slippery slope arguments by decreasing the probability of future paternalistic inter-
ventions. Moreover, autonomy-enhancing paternalism can be defended based on both liberal val-
ues and welfare considerations.  
 
Keywords: libertarian paternalism, behavioral economics, autonomy, preference learning, wel-
fare economics 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Behavioral economics has shown that individuals’ decisions are influenced by the decision-making 
context and that individuals sometimes make decisions that are not in their best interest 
(Kahneman, 2011; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In particular when decisions are made by the auto-
matic, intuitive “System 1” (Kahneman, 2011), individual decision-making is not always character-
ized by full rationality, perfect information processing, and complete self-control. Individuals rou-
tinely take decision-making shortcuts and decide based on heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974, Camerer, 2004). While many of these heuristics tend to work well in a wide range of con-
texts (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), the literature in behavioral economics has mostly focused on situa-
tions where biases and other distortions lead to non-optimal results (Conlisk, 1996; Rabin, 1998; 
Kahneman, 2003).  
 
The insights of behavioral economics have led to the implementation of behaviorally-informed 
policy interventions that help individuals to make better decisions without reducing their freedom 
of choice. Since freedom of choice is maintained, these forms of paternalism are classified as “lib-
ertarian” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; 
Sunstein, 2014).
1
 Libertarian paternalists argue that deviations from standard economic rationality 
prompt for the benign intervention by a social planner (in the words of Thaler and Sunstein (2008): 
a “choice architect”). This choice architect acts paternalistically by designing choices in a way that 
takes into account and even harnesses biases and heuristics to “nudge” individual decisions in di-
rections that these individuals would consider to be welfare-promoting when cognitively reflecting 
about the decisions with sufficient information at hand. To be considered libertarian, nudges must 
not be coercive by limiting individuals’ freedom of choice or, as Hausman and Welch (2010, p. 
126) add, by making alternatives significantly more costly. 
 
In this paper, we present an alternative form of soft paternalism called “autonomy-enhancing pa-
ternalism” (AEP). As its name indicates, AEP seeks to support individuals’ ability to make auton-
omous decisions. We suggest that most other forms of soft paternalism do not put enough emphasis 
on the importance of autonomy defined as the ability to make critically reflected decisions (as also 
                                                          
1
 A different example of soft paternalism is “asymmetric paternalism” (Camerer et al., 2003).  
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demanded in Binder, 2014).
2
 AEP acknowledges that behavioral interventions can – and typically 
will – change the strength of decision-making anomalies over time, and favors those interventions 
that improve, rather than reduce, individuals’ ability to make critically reflected, unbiased, auton-
omous decisions. While other forms of soft paternalism aim to improve the outcomes of individual 
decisions by modifying choice contexts (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), AEP suggests to use behav-
ioral insights to improve the processes that underlie individual decision-making, thus potentially 
benefiting the individual well beyond single choice contexts. AEP has many advantageous charac-
teristics: it takes individuals’ autonomy seriously,3 it prevents manipulation through behavioral 
policy interventions, it accounts for the heterogeneity of individuals, and it counteracts slippery 
slope arguments. Finally, AEP can be defended based on both liberal values and welfare considera-
tions.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes “autonomy-enhancing paternalism” as a new 
form of soft paternalism. We present examples of behaviorally informed policy interventions that 
are autonomy-enhancing, as well as interventions that are not. Section 3 discusses strengths and 
weaknesses of AEP. To illuminate the verbal discussion, section 4 illustrates some of our main 
points in a simple formal model. Section 5 concludes. 
  
II. AUTONOMY-ENHANCING PATERNALISM 
 
2.1. Definition 
 
We define autonomy as “the capacity of a person critically to reflect upon, and then attempt to ac-
cept or change, his or her preferences, desires, values, and ideals” (Dworkin, 1988, p. 48). Using 
the language of behavioral economic dual-process theories (e.g., Kahneman, 2011), we understand 
autonomous decision-making procedurally, viz. as being closely related to decision-making in the 
reflective System 2. An autonomous decision is made when the decision-maker has the possibility 
to let their reflective System 2 be responsible for the decision. This does not exclude the possibility 
that autonomous decisions are made by the intuitive System 1: individuals can deliberatively de-
                                                          
2
 This paper is the result of extensive discussions between the authors that were triggered by the critical view on liber-
tarian paternalism as expressed in Binder (2014), on which some of our criticism here build. 
3
 See also Hausman and Welch (2010), Korobkin (2011), Mills (2013). 
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cide to let their System 1 influence the decisions (however biased these might be).  But during an 
autonomous decision-process, individuals are always able to put System 2 back into power again. 
Also creating one’s own decision environment, sometimes this is referred to as “self-nudging” 
(Lades, 2014, p. 115), is an act of autonomous decision-making in our definition. Autonomy is 
then the possibility to make critically reflected decisions in System 2 that are not hindered by ex-
ternal or internal forces. When an individual, for example, cannot resist the temptation triggered by 
the perception of a chocolate cake, the decision to feast on it is not an autonomous one in this defi-
nition.
4
  
 
Autonomy-enhancing paternalism (AEP) suggests that behavioral interventions should foster criti-
cal thinking by strengthening System 2, weakening System 1, or encouraging that decisions are 
made in System 2 without affecting the strengths of the systems. Autonomy-enhancing policy in-
terventions promote self-empowerment (see Mills, 2013) and aim to free individuals from irrele-
vant influences (see Hausman and Welch, 2010). AEP proposes that the benefit of behaviorally 
informed paternalism lies in its intention to help individuals overcome their biases and decision-
making fallibilities and help them in making better thought-through, autonomous choices. AEP is 
somewhat akin to de-biasing strategies and related to Larrick’s (2004) argument that equipping 
individuals with mental strategies is preferable to changing choice contexts, because these strate-
gies can increase individuals’ ability to apply newly learned skills in other decision contexts. How-
ever, AEP is different from using de-biasing strategies, as it suggests using behavioral insights to 
modify the choice architecture in a way that promotes critical reflection. Similar to de-biasing, the 
focus of AEP is on helping individuals to become better decision-makers; it aims to improve well-
being through improving the processes of decision-making. This is in contrast to other forms of 
soft paternalism that aim to improve the outcomes of decision-making processes without concern-
ing themselves with how the decisions come about. While interventions that help individuals to 
make good decisions are likely to be beneficial for the individuals, interventions that change the 
choice architecture to help individuals to become good decision-makers, who are able to use their 
                                                          
4
 A referee points out that a different form of autonomy would consist in the tempted individual doing sports after 
eating the cake. In this perspective, one can debate whether the eating of the cake is actually an autonomous decision. 
In our framework, it would not be (if done in the ways described), whereas the second decision to run off the dietary 
effect of the cake would be an autonomous decision. In an overall assessment of the whole decision-making sequence, 
we would argue that the episode has been partly autonomous. These sorts of considerations will become relevant later 
on, when we put our concept into an explicitly dynamic perspective. 
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System 2 to make critically reflected decisions, are likely even more beneficial for the individuals.
5
  
 
AEP takes an explicitly dynamic perspective and acknowledges that behavioral interventions can 
have effects that last over time. From this dynamic perspective, improving decision-making pro-
cesses, rather than just improving the outcomes of decisions, is particularly valuable. When behav-
ioral interventions strengthen individuals’ decision-making abilities over time, their welfare is like-
ly to benefit beyond the time and domain where the interventions are effective.  Behavioral inter-
ventions can influence individuals’ abilities to learn about both their cognitive biases and their 
preferences. When individuals critically reflect upon their decisions, chances are that cognitive 
learning occurs. AEP prefers cognitive learning over non-cognitive learning because the latter of-
ten happens without the individual being aware of it and is thus more open to manipulation and the 
influence of other parties. AEP encourages those behavioral interventions that help individuals to 
become better decision-makers and thus make better informed, less biased, and more autonomous 
choices over time that may better reflect their true preferences.  
 
To fix ideas, let us compare autonomy-enhancing policy interventions with other interventions by 
means of a simple illustrative formalization. Assume that individuals are endowed with an income 
of I and have to allocate their income between a healthy good xH and an unhealthy good, say junk 
food, xJ with prices pH and pJ, respectively. The individuals have bounded rationality and some-
times make welfare-reducing errors. Let us describe a deviation from economic rationality by a 
bias η. This bias might occur when predictions and/or decisions are made intuitively in System 1.6 
The bias affects the individuals’ decision-making processes so that the individuals’ decision prob-
lem can be described by 
max-η U (xH,xJ) s.t. pHxH + pJxJ ≤ I,   (1) 
where max-η describes an admittedly simplified “behavioral economic” description of individual 
decision-making. Adding the decision-making bias to the equation allows us to formalize the ef-
fects that behavioral interventions have on the processes of individual decision-making; unbiased 
                                                          
5
 Note that we use the same language of dual process theories that libertarian paternalists use. However, libertarian 
paternalists use System 2 preferences to define what makes individuals better off and thus affects their welfare. AEP 
suggests encouraging System 2 decision-making. Libertarian paternalism links System 2 to outcomes, we link it to 
processes. 
6
 We use this error term as a catch-all for all types of deviations from standard economic rationality, which can repre-
sent failures to perceive alternatives as well as a failure to correctly evaluate them (see Mullainathan et al., 2012 for a 
related reduced-form approach). 
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decision-makers are not affected by any behavioral intervention. Consider a benevolent planner 
who aims to reduce the consumption of xJ. Assume that the planner can choose between four dif-
ferent types of policy interventions: a ban, a tax, a libertarian paternalistic nudge, and an autono-
my-enhancing intervention. Banning xJ will change equation 1 to 
max-η U(xH) s.t. pHxH ≤ I.  (2) 
Taxing xJ will increase the product’s price so that equation 1 becomes 
max-η U(xH,xJ)    s.t.    pHxH + pJ
tax
xJ ≤ I, (3) 
where pJ
tax 
> pJ. The two policy interventions obviously either reduce freedom of choice (in the 
case of the ban) or significantly change economic incentives (in the case of the tax).
7
 Hence, they 
are not libertarian according to the libertarian paternalistic definition. A libertarian paternalistic 
nudge might introduce a new bias, say θ, in order to neutralize the other bias so that equation (1) 
becomes  
max-η+θ U (xH,xJ) s.t. pHxH + pJxJ ≤ I. (4) 
As a result of the new bias θ (with θ = η), the individuals’ decisions are as if they were not prone to 
any bias, and the individuals consume the optimal amounts of xH and xJ.
8
 Note that if we had not 
added the possibility of decision-making biases (in this case η and θ) in the equation, the nudge 
would not have changed the formalization. Finally, an autonomy-enhancing behavioral interven-
tion aims to improve individual decision-making over time by increasing awareness of η and po-
tentially reducing the bias so that individuals become better decision-makers whose choices are not 
affected by any bias anymore. AEP is a form of soft paternalism that aims to use behavioral in-
sights to support individuals to become decision-makers who can best be approximated by  
max U (xH,xJ) s.t. pHxH + pJxJ ≤ I.   (5) 
Note that this formalization suggests that autonomous decision-making in System 2 is similar to 
the traditional economic assumption of rationally optimizing individuals.
9
 We are aware that while 
errors and biases tend to occur more frequently in System 1 than in System 2, most proponents of 
                                                          
7
 The distinction between taxes and bans is not perfect: One could argue that bans do not reduce the choice set, but just 
increase the price of (then illegal) products. Also taxes do not only change incentives, but might also reduce individu-
als’ budget so that their choice set is reduced. 
8
 The universe of nudges is large. Introducing a mechanism that uses one bias to neutralize another is just one of many 
ways how nudges can affect individual behavior.  
9
 A lot can be criticized about using “rational choice” as the normative benchmark of how individuals should behave 
(Berg et al., 2011, Binder, 2014). While we don’t think that individuals will ever attain such strict rational choice abili-
ties, in the present paper we argue that obtaining a comparatively more rational decision-making ability is conducive to 
the individuals’ best interests. 
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dual process theories do not argue that System 2 choices are rational according to rational choice 
postulates (see Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). At most System 2 choices can be 
considered to be closer to a rational benchmark of optimal behavior. Our argument thus solely pos-
its that System 2 choices tend to be more autonomous than intuitive System 1 choices, and that 
equation (5) is the best approximation for autonomous behavior we have.  
 
2.2. Examples 
 
In general, interventions that reduce the effects of biases on individual decision-making are auton-
omy-enhancing: this can encompass “simplification”, “de-biasing”, and “reframing” of consumer 
choices (see Larrick, 2004, Trout, 2005). Other, slightly more coercive instruments apply as well: 
cooling-off periods and “required active choosing” (mandated choice), for example, increase au-
tonomy by allowing individuals to reconsider their choices and by increasing the awareness that 
decisions can be made, respectively. Some behavioral interventions do not enhance, or might even 
reduce, autonomy. Examples of these interventions are defaults, neutralizing one bias by another 
one, and influencing preferences by anchors. We elaborate on these examples in the following. 
 
One of the most obvious examples of an autonomy-enhancing intervention, and the least restrictive 
on liberty, is simplification. Choice architecture that is too complex can overwhelm individuals and 
thus activate heuristics and biases in System 1. Instead of reflectively answering correct questions 
in System 2, overwhelmed individuals might use System 1 to answer related questions that are eas-
ier to answer (Kahneman, 2011). Presenting information in simple and intuitive ways that help 
individuals to make well-informed System 2 decisions does increase autonomy. For example, in 
the U.S. the food pyramid was replaced by “myplate” as a much simpler way to illustrate the five 
food groups that are the building blocks for a healthy diet (see Sunstein, 2013).
10
 With this infor-
mation at hand, individuals are able to better make critically reflected decisions. This is in line with 
Loewenstein and Haisley (2008), who argue for some form of behavioral intervention especially in 
situations that are complex and where people lack experience in decision-making. It is also in line 
with one of the principles of good regulation, “make it simple”, as Sunstein (2013) has introduced 
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 A different example for de-biasing by simplifying a decision problem is to present conditional probabilities in the 
form of natural frequencies (see Gigerenzer, 2011). 
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it.
11
  
 
Another instrument in the toolbox of AEP, which is related to simplification, is to reduce choice 
sets to magnitudes that do not overwhelm individuals so that they fail to come to autonomous deci-
sions (Camerer et al., 2003; Trout, 2005). Providing all choice options may provide the maximal 
freedom of choice, but it is likely to reduce individuals’ ability to make critically reflected deci-
sions when individuals are overwhelmed by their choice sets and hence procrastinate on the choic-
es (and choose not to choose). For example, requiring a person to choose from thousands of mutual 
funds for their pension schemes has been shown to decrease choice rates as opposed to choice situ-
ations with only few mutual funds (Iyengar et al., 2003). Reducing choice sets to manageable sizes 
might encourage (boundedly rational) individuals to actively make decisions (instead of, for exam-
ple, relying on default rules). Enabling individuals to make these initial decisions on simplified, 
preprocessed choice sets may facilitate individuals’ ability to make more complex decisions later 
on and is thus autonomy-enhancing. To ensure that individuals can critically reflect upon the larger 
choice sets later on, initial reductions of the choice sets should be complemented by the infor-
mation about the existence of the larger choice sets. Such information reduces the risk that the pre-
processing of the choice sets discards alternatives that might be of interest to some individuals, and 
the individuals’ ability to look beyond preprocessed choice sets is maintained.12  
 
Some autonomy-enhancing interventions activate System 2 so that although biases in System 1 
might still be present, these do not drive decision-making. Forcing people to make choices is coer-
cive as it reduces their choice sets by removing the freedom not to choose. However, such coercion 
can also increase individuals’ autonomy: mechanisms of required active choosing can bring to at-
tention the possibility to decide in situations where this possibility would have not been obvious 
and probably neglected by the individuals (Hausman and Welch, 2010, p. 134). For example, when 
individuals are asked whether to save for retirement or not before being allowed to start their job, 
they are made aware of the possibility and necessity to save for old age and thus are encouraged to 
                                                          
11
 AEP is explicitly not in line with other principles of regulation that Sunstein (2013) introduces, such as “make it 
automatic” and “don’t strain System 2”. 
12
Giving information about the existence of larger choice sets also allows individuals to respond individually to the 
pre-processing of the choice sets. Especially when individuals are heterogeneous, providing such information seems 
desirable.   
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reflect on their respective preferences.
13
 Cooling-off periods increase autonomy, too, because deci-
sions made in the spur of the moment can be reversed after critical (re-) consideration so that the 
individual has the possibility to make a critically-reflected decision afterwards.
 
  
 
Making individuals aware of decision-making anomalies identified in behavioral economics and 
cognate disciplines can enhance individuals’ autonomy, too. Only when individuals know that de-
cision-making biases may have an influence on their current and future behavior, can they critical-
ly reflect upon whether they are willing to let their behavior be influenced by these biases. For ex-
ample, informing people about the factors that lead to impulsive choices can help the individuals to 
organize their lives to either generate or prevent impulsive decisions (Lades, 2014). This provision 
of information can be combined with offering commitment devices that critically reflecting indi-
viduals can install to constrain their future selves’ behaviors, which would be considered to be an 
instrument of AEP (see Bryan et al., 2010). 
 
While many behavioral interventions discussed in the literature on soft paternalism can enhance 
autonomy, there are also interventions that do not enhance, or even reduce, autonomy. For exam-
ple, many default rules are likely not autonomy-enhancing. If individuals are prone to inertia, have 
preferences for a status quo, and are subject to the “yeah-whatever heuristic” (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008), they might learn to rely on default rules set by the government or other choice architects. As 
a result, behavioral biases might become stronger over time. For example, in an experimental set-
ting, de Haan and Linde (2012) show that good defaults can induce individuals to (mistakenly) 
follow random defaults later on. In a related vein, Carlin et al. (2013) show that the information 
inherent in defaults can reduce individuals’ information acquisition incentives so that social wel-
fare decreases.  
 
Also behavioral policy interventions that aim to neutralize one decision anomaly by another one 
may reduce, or, at least, do not enhance, autonomy. Consider the use of risk narratives as suggested 
by Jolls and Sunstein (2006). These risk narratives aim to counteract individuals’ optimism bias 
(which causes too much risk taking) by harnessing individuals’ availability bias. The government 
could demand producers of risky products to provide the consumers with stories of single instances 
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 Too many of such forced choice paradigms, however, might overstrain the individuals. This would necessitate quick 
System 1 decisions and thus cause reductions in autonomy. 
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where the use of the product in question had problematic outcomes. Since individuals overempha-
size such information, the narrative can neutralize individuals’ optimism bias.14 Another example 
is the organization of food in cafeterias as described in Thaler and Sunstein (2008).  Choice archi-
tects utilize the fact that food products presented on eye level in cafeterias are purchased more of-
ten than food products in less salient positions (Hanks, et al. 2013) to neutralize present-biased 
preferences for tasty but unhealthy food items. Putting healthy food in the most salient positions is 
likely to induce more healthy consumption already in the short run. However, learning opportuni-
ties might be missed, and individuals’ present-biased preferences are not reduced by the arrange-
ment of the food. Whenever one bias is successfully used to neutralize another bias, the outcome of 
the decision is as if the individuals behaved in an unbiased way. However, the decision-making 
process that led to the decision was not an autonomous one.  
 
Finally, setting anchors that the individual does not know about can reduce autonomy because an-
chors, like many nudges, can induce preferences of which the individual is not aware. Anchors can 
be used in cases where individuals are conjectured not to have well-formed preferences and where 
anchors function as a signal of what the policy-maker thinks would be a reasonably welfare-
improving choice (e.g. pension savings rates of “2%…5%” vs. “10%…20%” of one’s wages). If 
anchors are used without providing an explanation for the height of the anchor chosen, individuals 
are likely to not learn from making their choice between the preprocessed alternatives. Individuals 
might think that their expressed preference is their preference although the preference was induced 
in the instant before through the anchor. In the long run, this will lead to individuals forming pref-
erences that were ill-reflected and can be considered heteronomous. In order to be an acceptable 
tool in the toolbox of AEP, anchors would always need to be complemented by some sort of cue 
that makes individuals aware that in their heterogeneous life circumstances, a different value than 
the anchor chosen by the policy-maker might actually be more appropriate (e.g. “Warning: retire-
ment savings of 10% of your monthly wages will avoid poverty on average, but this amount needs 
to be increased depending on your age and existing savings.”). 
  
III. DISCUSSION 
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 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing at this example.  
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In the following, we discuss important features of AEP and compare them briefly to the currently 
most popular form of soft paternalism, libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). While a 
subset of behavioral interventions discussed in the literature on soft paternalism are in line with 
both forms of paternalism, the behavioral intervention’s justifications can differ between both ap-
proaches. Discussing on what grounds policy interventions are justified or not is important because 
it is likely that in the future more behavioral biases will be identified in behavioral economics and 
cognate disciplines and more behavioral interventions will be used (which need to be justified).  
Also for interventions that do not exist yet it is important to have clear guidelines to evaluate their 
effects, possible dangers, and permissibility.   
 
3.1. Autonomy and freedom of choice  
 
In the libertarian paternalistic logic, acceptable behavioral interventions are supposed to preserve 
freedom of choice (and do not significantly change incentives). Preserving freedom of choice, 
however, is a very narrow view of defining liberty (see e.g., Qizilbash, 2012, Korobkin, 2011).
15
  
Liberty can also be understood (more substantively) in terms of the ability to make critically re-
flected, i.e. autonomous, decisions. This ability is an important feature of liberal and libertarian 
views, and interventions in the spirit of AEP increase this ability.  
 
One advantage of focusing on autonomy, rather than on freedom of choice, is that maintaining and 
even fostering individual autonomy acts as a safeguard against exploitation and manipulation of 
the individual by the paternalist. Interventions that encourage individuals to make critically reflect-
ed decisions are transparent. To be sure, libertarian paternalism does not imply that the individual 
will always be manipulated. But the core theoretical concept of libertarian paternalism does allow 
that some nudges are manipulative (this holds especially for default rules) and keep individuals in 
the dark about the fact that there is some behavioral regulation. Only by adding an additional 
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 Libertarian paternalism is also internally inconsistent when accepting the notion of liberty as freedom of choice. If 
individuals are “tricked” into choices by the libertarian paternalist through the setting of default rules, they might not 
be aware of being nudged into certain behaviors. When an individual is not aware of the nudge, only nominal freedom 
of choice is left intact, for all intents and purposes, the real choice set (the one the individual acts on) is decreased and 
choices are de facto “blocked” (see also Rebonato, 2012, p. 132; this is not to say that this holds for all cases and all 
tools in the toolbox of the choice architect, but it will likely hold for a number of tools). One positive thing to say in 
favor of hard paternalism is that individuals are at least aware that they are being curtailed in their liberty or autonomy 
and can try and oppose this. The hidden character of some of the tools of the libertarian paternalist make this extremely 
difficult and by this disable another safeguard against this particular slippery slope (Rebonato, 2012, p. 132). 
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“transparency criterion” (see Bovens, 2009) libertarian paternalists prevent the possibility of ma-
nipulation. AEP does not need an additional criterion to prevent manipulation. Already the focus 
on encouraging autonomous decision-making renders manipulation less likely. Thus, AEP is not 
susceptible to objections arguing that soft paternalism is not acceptable because manipulation is 
morally undesirable, contravenes liberal ideas, and paints a cynical picture of the role that legisla-
tors and policy-makers should play vis-à-vis sovereign citizens (this has been pointed out similarly 
by Hausman and Welch, 2010, p. 134). 
 
Distinguishing between autonomy and freedom of choice also allows making trade-offs between 
both liberal values. Reducing individuals’ freedom of choice can increase their autonomy and vice 
versa. Acknowledging the importance of autonomy allows justifying some interventions that bene-
fit the individual even when freedom of choice is reduced. For example, although reducing the 
number of mutual funds that individuals have to choose from for their pension schemes (Iyengar et 
al., 2003) is often related to libertarian paternalism, the reduction of the choice set is not “libertari-
an” as defined in the concept. Our point here is that libertarian paternalism with its focus on free-
dom of choice is somewhat blind to the possibility that reduced freedom of choice in favor of in-
creased autonomy might be a desirable trade-off. 
 
3.2. Autonomy and the dynamic perspective 
 
Many behavioral interventions have a strong intuitive appeal when described as one-shot situations 
without any regard for inter-temporal dynamics. In one-shot situations, one might be tempted to 
approve of many interventions that have the ability to correct a given choice and thus increase in-
dividual well-being, even at the expense of autonomy. However, acknowledging that interventions 
often also influence future choices can change the evaluation of these interventions, and dynamic 
effects need to be explicitly considered. We highlight two interdependent ways how behavioral 
interventions can affect future choices: (a) via preference learning and (b) via changing the strength 
of the deviation from rationality.  
 
Regarding the behavioral interventions’ effects on preference learning, it is important to 
acknowledge that individual preferences cannot be reasonably well assumed to be given and stable 
(Witt, 1991; Binder, 2010). Some actions are not only driven by preferences, but also create or 
13 
 
 
change preferences (Ariely and Norton, 2008). Economic processes and policies, including soft 
paternalistic interventions, can shape preferences. A behavioral intervention at time t+0 may (and 
likely will) influence choices at time t+1 and afterwards. For example, a behavioral intervention 
that increases individuals’ propensity to eat healthy may reduce their propensity to eat junk food in 
the future because individuals get used to healthy eating. While this is a case where individuals 
might like their vanishing preference for junk food, one has to be aware of the effects of behavioral 
interventions on preference learning when evaluating soft paternalistic policy interventions. 
 
Preference learning and change is well-researched in psychology: preferences can be learned in a 
cognitive way, i.e. autonomously as a result of cognitive reflection. But most often individuals 
learn preferences via associative learning without being aware of this (Hergenhahn and Olson, 
1997; Witt, 2001).
16
 In this case, behavioral interventions are more effective (also nudges work 
best “in the dark”, see Bovens, 2009), but also more problematic. If behavioral policies induce un-
conscious preference learning, individuals are not able to make conscious and autonomous deci-
sions about which preferences they want to learn. Without the ability to make autonomous deci-
sions, behavioral interventions can put individuals at danger of losing their ability to pursue their 
own happiness (Schubert, 2012).
17
 Moreover, preferences resulting from associative learning tend 
to be highly stable and difficult to unlearn, in parts because of the low conscious involvement, but 
also because of repeated reinforcement over long time horizons.
18
 Even if, at one point in time, 
individuals were to become aware of the intervention’s influence on their preferences, the sticki-
ness of associative preference learning can actually make it very difficult to make a critically-
reflected decision in the future and reverse this preference: while this obviously holds for addictive 
preferences (a benign example of which might be coffee), many other preferences that were 
learned without cognitive involvement and have been reinforced many times come to mind (food 
preferences, social preferences, etc., see Zajonc and Markus, 1982). Interventions in line with AEP 
encourage individuals to make conscious decisions about which preferences they want to learn; 
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 Many of our childhood preferences are acquired via associative learning and tend to be not easily reversible (Zajonc 
and Markus, 1982).  
17Nudges can also put individuals at danger of “learning” helplessness (Binder, 2014). This can create preference learn-
ing trajectories where individuals are locked-in into preferences one can doubt are in the individuals’ actual interests 
(see also Schubert and Cordes, 2013). These preferences are likely to reflect the norms society adheres to at a given 
moment (or, even worse, they reflect ad hoc goals of policy-makers). 
18
 Whether preferences can be unlearned depends inter alia on the reinforcement schedule (see more extensively Bind-
er, 2010, sec. 6.4.3); even if preferences can ultimately be unlearned, the costs associated with this are much higher 
than libertarian paternalists claim they would be in the case of opt-outs. 
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AEP does not try to influence individuals’ preference learning paths under the radar of individual 
consciousness.  
 
Behavioral interventions can also change the strength of decision-making biases over time. Most 
libertarian paternalistic nudges operate via System 1 without encouraging critical reflection and are 
thus unlikely to reduce decision-making biases. To the contrary, nudges might even strengthen 
decision-making anomalies over time. Individuals might implicitly learn to trust the choice archi-
tecture and to rely on their System 1 when making decisions. For example, defaults, especially 
good defaults, might strengthen individuals’ inertia and make them inactive so that their future 
behavior is even more strongly influenced by future defaults (see de Haan and Linde, 2012; Carlin 
et al., 2013). This could encourage policy-makers to make more use of behavioral interventions 
over time. AEP favors interventions that promote, rather than reduce, individuals’ ability to make 
critically reflected decisions in their System 2. If behavioral paternalistic interventions increase 
autonomy and facilitate critical reflection, future behavioral interventions will become less power-
ful over time. Individuals will make more and more decisions in their System 2, and these deci-
sions are not prone to the biases that soft paternalistic interventions try to harness to influence be-
havior. The dynamic perspective inherent in AEP thus makes a case for less soft paternalism over 
time and counters reservations against soft paternalism based on slippery-slope arguments (Rizzo 
and Whitman, 2009).
19
  
 
Sunstein (2014) proposes that it is hard to see why libertarian paternalistic nudges should be seen 
objectionable if they work only or largely because of the operations in System 1. Since choice ar-
chitecture is inevitable, he argues, nudges should not be ruled off limits merely because they work 
as a result of the operations of System 1, as long as they are made public and defended on their 
merits. However, when considering that nudges can change the strength of decision-making anom-
alies over time, and influence the degree to which people make decisions in System 1 or System 2, 
one can see some additional costs of nudging. It seems to us that behavioral policy interventions – 
in particular those implemented by the government – should not enlarge the scope of the choice 
architecture that is “inevitable”. Just like freedom of choice is a matter of degree (there can be 
                                                          
19
 Some critics also argue that oft paternalism can increase the probability of hard paternalism, thus creating a slippery 
slope with regard to the number and types of interventions (e.g., Rizzo and Whitman, 2009). We emphasize dynamic 
changes occurring within the nudged individuals, not within policy-makers or societal norms. 
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more or less freedom of choice), decisions can be more or less strongly influenced by the choice 
architecture, and autonomy-enhancing interventions make sure that the power of the choice archi-
tecture does not increase over time. 
 
3.3. Autonomy, welfare, and the dynamic perspective 
 
While we argue that behavioral interventions should enhance autonomy, ultimately, the overriding 
value judgment to justify paternalism has to be that interventions increase individual welfare (oth-
erwise the interventions would not be paternalistic). From the perspective of AEP, however, it is 
not justified to increase welfare at the expense of autonomy. But it is also not justified to increase 
autonomy at high costs of welfare. Hence, the effects of behavioral interventions on individual 
autonomy and welfare must be evaluated. One argument in favor of libertarian paternalistic behav-
ioral interventions is that their net effect on welfare is positive (Sunstein, 2014). On the one hand, 
large welfare gains can be realized by making decisions for less rational individuals that make 
them better off. On the other hand, the costs of these interventions are supposed to be low as they 
consist of only small reductions in freedom of choice and some behavioral influence is inevitable 
(e.g., Trout, 2005; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Camerer et al., 2003; Sunstein, 2014). However, 
behavioral interventions can affect individuals’ welfare both in the short run and the long run, and 
both immediate and delayed costs and benefits have to be taken into account when engaging in a 
cost benefit analysis of behavioral interventions. Autonomy, we argue, is essential when analyzing 
the delayed effects of behavioral interventions on individual welfare.  
 
Acknowledging that behavioral interventions at time t+0 can influence individual welfare also in 
the future (at time t+1) prompts a more careful distinction of cases, and it is an empirical question 
which behavioral interventions fall into what category. “Ideal autonomy-enhancing interventions”, 
which AEP encourages, increase autonomy (and possibly also welfare) at time t+0 and through 
their dynamic learning effects, autonomy and welfare are also increased in the future at time t+1.  
“Painful autonomy-enhancing interventions” increase autonomy in t+0, but also reduce welfare in 
the short run, for example because learning costs are high, it takes effort to engage in active deci-
sion-making, or different cognitive biases offset each other (see Besharov, 2004).
20
 Through in-
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 A different, practical question would be how to deal with cases where several biases interact. Our hunch in the spirit 
of self-limiting paternalism (anti-slippery-slope) would be to restrict interventions to clear-cut cases where such inter-
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creased autonomy, however, AEP suggests that welfare in t+1 may be increased. The evaluation of 
the success of these paternalistic interventions then depends on whether long-run welfare gains (in 
t+1) outweigh the short-run costs in t+0. The welfare gains in t+1 of interventions that enhance 
individuals’ autonomy are particularly large when possibilities for learning exist and when similar 
decisions will be repeated in the future. When there is no possibility for individuals to learn, or 
when the decisions affected by the behavioral intervention are once-in-a-lifetime decisions, the 
positive long-run effects of autonomy-enhancing interventions on welfare are likely to be smaller 
(but even then, making an important decision in one domain might provide a lesson for other do-
mains).
21
  
 
“Manipulative, but well-motivated interventions” increase welfare in t+0, but undermine autonomy 
so that individuals cannot learn from the situation, and welfare in t+1 might be decreased. In the 
short run, such manipulative interventions that utilize the knowledge about biases and decision-
making anomalies might be more effective in generating welfare-enhancing outcomes than inter-
ventions that encourage critical reflection. For example, when defaults are set, the short run effort 
of making decisions is smaller that when individuals are required to make their own choices so that 
the defaults may lead to higher welfare than mandated choice arrangements.
22
 In the long-run, 
however, this relation might reverse. While it might be the case that default rules impose less costs 
for a given level of welfare gain at time t+0, they might come at the expense of welfare at time t+1: 
in the long run, default rules might lead individuals to learn to be dependent and inactive. Individu-
als then, without the constant attention of the paternalist, might suffer welfare-losses since they 
never learned to autonomously decide in such situations. Relieving individuals of the need to make 
complex and important life decisions will likely have higher long-term costs than a one-shot per-
spective suggests.
23
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
action effects are sufficiently well-known to have an estimate of welfare effects in both periods. 
21
 There is also the possibility that autonomy breeds misery”, i.e. the “unhappy egg-head effect”, where increasing 
autonomy leads to lowered welfare in both periods. Such interventions do not fall in the remit of AEP because AEP is 
a form of paternalism and hence aims to increase individual well-being.  
22
 It might be the case that behavioral interventions impose other short-run costs on individuals. For example, when 
individuals derive utility from choosing, default rules that take away the recognition that a choice is necessary might 
reduce utility (Sunstein, 2014). 
23
 A related dynamic aspect that is neglected in the one-shot perspective of libertarian paternalism is the question of the 
correct temporal interval to judge paternalistic interventions. Many behavioral interventions seem plausible when only 
the immediate effects on welfare are considered. But often it is appropriate to consider longer time intervals when 
evaluating the success of interventions. Consider, for example, an individual who binges on cake at time t+0. Assume 
that a regulator aims to combat this behavior and “defaults away” the cake so that the individual does not binge. But is 
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A final consideration when it comes to the welfare-aspects of AEP is the heterogeneity of actors: 
One of the arguments often used to criticize libertarian paternalistic policy interventions is that 
they do not take into account that individuals are heterogeneous: one-size-fits-all interventions are 
likely to reduce welfare of individuals who deviate from the average. For example, individuals 
might be defaulted into a pension saving program that does not fit their individual circumstances. 
AEP does not have this problem as its toolkit respects individual heterogeneity: no decisions are 
made for individuals, but individuals are made aware of the need to make a decision. Required 
active choosing, potentially combined with simplification procedures, for example, helps individu-
als to make a decision, but the ultimate decision is made by the individuals based on their individu-
al idiosyncractic preferences and life circumstances (albeit based on a less biased decision-making 
process than without AEP). 
 
3.4. Limitations 
 
AEP is not without faults: maybe the strongest disadvantage of AEP comes in terms of a cost bene-
fit analysis based on its welfare implications: interventions that encourage critical reflection in Sys-
tem 2 slow down the process of decision-making. Decision-making in System 2 uses more cogni-
tive resources than fast and automatic decision-making in System 1. This loss in efficiency may 
reduce individuals’ welfare. As Sunstein (2013) observes, people are busy and do not have much 
time to make a lot of decisions in System 2. Hence, he suggests following some general principles 
of behavioral regulation, including: make it simple, intuitive, meaningful, automatic, and don’t 
strain System 2. While the first three principles are also in line with AEP, the last two are clearly 
not. AEP proposes that in order to reduce the strain on System 2 it is much better to make decisions 
easier so that System 2 can make autonomous and quick decisions than to make decisions automat-
ic, let System 1 and all its biases decide, and possibly reduce the individuals’ ability to make criti-
cally reflected decisions over time. Nevertheless, forcing individuals to make too many important 
autonomous decisions might lead to decision fatigue (Baumeister et al., 1998; Hagger et al., 2010) 
and hence has to be acknowledged as a disadvantage. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
there the need for a nudge if the policy-maker could similarly inform the individual of the bad habit and suggest doing 
sports to offset the effect? A critically-reflecting individual might choose to binge on the cake in t+0 and go for an 
extended workout in t+1. When considering this extended interval of time it is unclear why there should be any inter-
vention that tries to make the individual not eat the cake in t+0. 
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Secondly, autonomy-enhancing interventions could generate unforeseen consequences. For exam-
ple, when multiple biases offset each other so that the outcomes of individual behavior are (nearly) 
optimal, autonomy-enhancing interventions that counteract only one of the cognitive biases might 
reduce individual welfare (see Besharov, 2004).
24
 This is particularly problematic when policy-
makers do not have the perfect information about the system of biases that might influence indi-
viduals’ behavior. In such cases, AEP encourages interventions that reduce all biases; but even 
when only a subset of the biases can be reduced, AEP is in favor of that, as long as a long-run wel-
fare gain is likely to result. This would be a case of “painful autonomy-enhancing interventions” as 
described in section 3.3. Note, however, that an autonomy-enhancing intervention that is not likely 
to increase welfare at least in the long-run would not be considered AEP, because such an interven-
tion would lack an important qualifier of “paternalism”, namely its aim to positively influence wel-
fare.  
 
Finally, in some cases the possibilities to critically reflect upon one’s decision and to reverse one’s 
choice can reduce individual welfare, because the possibility to reverse a decision can lead to deci-
sion regret. Individuals only fully commit to a decision when the decision is no longer reversible 
(Schwartz, 2000, Gilbert and Ebert, 2002) so that it is sometimes better for one’s welfare not to 
have the opportunity to reverse one’s choice. This case, to which a referee alerted us, shows a 
trade-off between welfare and autonomy. While AEP would suggest in this case that the paternalist 
is ill-advised to try to improve welfare through taking away the possibility to revert the choice after 
critical reflection, libertarian paternalism might promote such an autonomy-reducing, but welfare-
enhancing intervention. 
 
IV. ILLUSTRATION: “OPTIMAL SIN NUDGES”  
 
In this section we present a simple formal model in order to illustrate effects of autonomy-
enhancing interventions on individual well-being over time. The model is a variant of O’Donoghue 
and Rabin’s (2006) model that analyzes optimal taxes for “sin goods” assuming that individuals 
have present-biased preferences. We additionally assume that individual perceptions of costs and 
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 We like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this limitation.  
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benefits of sin goods can be distorted. Our analysis is thus related to Besharov (2004) who investi-
gates the effects of corrective interventions when individuals are prone to a combination of several 
biases (he considers present-biased preferences, regret, and overconfidence). We investigate an 
initial situation where present-biased preferences but no distorted perceptions are present and lead 
to overconsumption of sin goods. We assume that choice architects aim to reduce the consumption 
of these sin goods. We do not investigate harder forms of paternalism such as bans or taxes. In our 
illustrative case, behavioral interventions can either reduce present-biased preferences or operate 
through distorted perceptions. Since the initial overconsumption of sin goods is the result of pre-
sent-biased preferences alone, interventions that reduce the present-bias enhance autonomy and 
interventions that change individuals’ perceptions decrease autonomy. We sketch possible effects 
of these behavioral interventions on individual well-being, acknowledging that behavioral inter-
ventions can influence individual behavior for more than the contemporaneous time period. 
 
4.1. The model 
 
Assume that individuals (for example children in a school cafeteria) can choose between two types 
of goods: “normal” goods and “sin goods”. The latter are particularly unhealthy (think of junk 
food). Normal goods are a composite of many goods. Sin goods generate utility with a decreasing 
marginal rate. Following Kahneman et al. (1997), we call this utility “experienced utility”. The 
consumption of sin goods has negative consequences in the future. Consumers are endowed with 
income I, which is large compared to the consumption of the sin goods, and they do not save or 
borrow. The experienced utility from consuming the sin good xt and the normal good zt at time t is 
given by ut = v(xt; ρ) - c(xt-1; γ) + zt. While the function v(xt; ρ) represents the immediate benefits 
from current consumption of the sin goods, c(xt-1; γ) depicts the negative health consequences from 
past consumption of sin goods. The parameters ρ and γ are exogenously given context variables 
determining the extent to which the consumption of xt leads to benefits and costs, respectively.
25
 
We assume that vxρ > 0 and cxγ > 0 so that a higher ρ reflects a higher marginal benefit from con-
sumption, and a higher γ reflects a higher marginal health cost from consumption. We normalize 
the price of the normal (composite) goods to be unity (our numeraire). 
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 In O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (2006) model, these variables capture population heterogeneity in tastes. 
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We assume that the benefits and costs of period-t consumption are additively separable from the 
benefits and costs of consumption in any other period. Hence, for each (x, z)-bundle, the individu-
al’s experienced utility can be written as 
u(x,z) = v(x; ρ) - δc(x; γ) + z,  (5) 
where δ depicts the conventional discount factor. In the following, we will assume δ to be unity. In 
every period, individuals could maximize their experienced utility given by equation (5) by allocat-
ing their income I to the two goods x and z in an optimal way. The optimal allocation of income 
(x**, z**) maximizes experienced utility subject to the resource constraint x + z ≤ I. Hence, x** 
satisfies vx(x**;ρ) - cx(x**;γ) - 1 = 0 and z** = I - x**. 
 
Individuals’ actual behavior, however, sometimes deviates from the behavior that maximizes expe-
rienced utility. Following Kahneman et al. (1997), we describe these deviations by assuming that 
individuals actually maximize their “decision utility” (or “wanting”), although maximizing their 
experienced utility (or “liking”) would be optimal for their well-being (see also Besharov, 2004).26 
In this model, present biased preferences and distorted perceptions of the costs and benefits of sin 
goods can lead to dissociations between decision utility and experienced utility. Individual percep-
tions are described by α. When α = 1, there is no distortion. However, when α deviates from unity, 
the perceived effects of the consumption of x on present benefits and future costs can be lower (α < 
1) or higher (α > 1) than the true effects.27 When integrating the possibility of distorted perceptions 
and assuming that δ equals unity, the decision utility ud at time t can be described by ud(x, z) = v(x; 
αρρ) – c(x; αγγ) + z. 
 
Present-biased preferences describe the tendency to impulsively pursue immediate gratification. 
Following e.g. Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), we assume that the individuals’ 
inter-temporal decision utility at time t is given by U(ût,…ûT) = ût+β∑
T
τ=t+1 δ
τ-t
ûτ , where û is the 
individual’s decision utility at any given point in time and δ is a conventional discount factor 
which we assume to be unity. Present-biased preferences are described by the parameter β. While β 
                                                          
26
 Actual happiness is synonymous to “experienced utility” as introduced by Kahneman et al. (1997) and Berridge and 
Aldrige’s (2008) “liking”. We use actual happiness as benchmark for individuals’ interests/well-being. Individual 
preferences are synonymous to “decision utility” (Kahneman et al., 1997) and “wanting” (Berridge and Aldridge, 
2008). Preferences, but not actual happiness, can be subject to faulty affective forecasts or other biases (see more ex-
tensively Lades, 2012; Witt and Binder, 2013). 
27
 We acknowledge that in many situations it is difficult to define the meaning of α = 1 because some choice architec-
ture is often inevitable.  
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is below 1 in terms of decision utility, in terms of experienced utility,  β is equal to 1 (see Lades, 
2012 for a micro-foundation of β based on the dissociation of utility into components of wanting 
and liking). Since we assume that also the perceived benefits and costs from period-t consumption 
are additively separable from the perceived benefits and costs from consumption in any other peri-
od, at any time period the decision utility û(x, z) corresponding to the consumption of x and z with 
the potential for distorted perceptions (α ≠ 1) and present-biased preferences (β < 1) can be written 
as 
û(x, z) = v(x; αρρ) – βc(x; αγγ) + z. (6) 
In every period, the individual chooses a consumption bundle (x, z) that maximizes equation (6) 
subject to the budget constraint x + z ≤ I. Again, the units of the goods are chosen so that both 
prices are 1, per-period income I is large compared to the consumption of x, and individuals do not 
save or borrow. When individuals maximize û(x, z) subject to the budget constraint, they allocate 
their income in a way that maximizes decision utility and is depicted by (x*, z*). The actual con-
sumption of the unhealthy good satisfies vx(x*; αρρ) – βcx(x*; αγγ) - 1 = 0, and the consumption of 
the composite good is z* = I – x*. It is straightforward to see that self-control problems (β < 1) can 
lead to overconsumption of the sin good (x* > x**) (see O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006). But also 
can distorted perceptions lead to deviations from optimal consumption. However, it is not a priori 
clear whether distorted perceptions lead to more or less consumption of the unhealthy good. Per-
ceived costs and benefits of unhealthy consumption can be either higher or lower than actual costs 
and benefits. Note that different deviations from rationality can, in principle, cancel each other out. 
 
4.2. Behavioral Policy Interventions  
 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) investigate the extent to which taxes can reduce differences be-
tween decision utility and experienced utility arising from present-biased preferences. We use the 
model to illustrate some effects of soft policy interventions. Assume that individuals have self-
control problems (β < 1), but no distorted perceptions (αρ = 1, and αγ = 1). A social planner realizes 
that individuals overconsume the unhealthy good. The planner decides to use behavioral insights to 
nudge individuals towards the choices that make them presumably better off, i.e. towards consum-
ing x** instead of x*. In this model, there are three behavioral strategies that the social planner can 
use to achieve behavioral change: they can (a) make unhealthy consumption appear less favorable 
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by reducing αρ, they can (b) increase the perceived future costs of consuming unhealthy today by 
increasing αγ, and they can (c) try to reduce the tendency to pursue immediate gratification and 
bring β to unity. We assume that behavioral interventions can change αρ, αγ, and β for longer than 
only the current period. 
 
First, assume that the policy-maker aims to reduce αρ to αρ
n
 (αρ
n < αρ), i.e. the policy-maker reduces 
the perceived benefits of the sin good (for example by using framing effects to reduce the attrac-
tiveness of junk food). Assume that the intervention is successful and the consumption of the un-
healthy good is reduced so that x
n 
= x**. Note, however, that now a situation has emerged, where 
two deviations from rationality cancel each other out. Consumption of the unhealthy good now 
satisfies vx(x**; αρ
nρ) – βcx(x**; αγγ) - 1 = 0, so that the outcome is as if the underlying behavior 
was rational. However, since β < 1 and αρ
n
 < 1, this is not the case.  
 
Based on the rules of libertarian paternalism everything is fine as well-being has increased without 
decreasing freedom of choice.
28
 A social planner engaging in AEP, however, would not implement 
this intervention because it does not help individuals to make well-informed, critically reflected 
decisions. To the contrary, the intervention introduces a new bias (αρ
n
 < 1), which might become 
stronger over time and induce unconscious preference learning. Moreover, the new bias hides the 
present-bias from individuals’ views. If interventions hide biases, individuals will be less likely to 
realize similarly biased behavior in future situations.
29
  
 
The problematic character of behavioral interventions that do not enhance autonomy becomes par-
ticularly obvious when, for any reasons, the decision context changes over time (individuals might, 
for example, change the school and go to another cafeteria). In the first decision context, say at 
time t+0, individuals did not have the opportunity to understand the actual reasons for the overcon-
sumption of the unhealthy good (actually there was no overconsumption). The individuals’ pre-
sent-biases are not reduced and β is still below unity. Moreover, as a result of the behavioral inter-
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Jolls and Sunstein (2006) explicitly refer to such strategies when discussing that some forms of bounded rationality 
can counteract other forms of bounded rationality. For example, they suggest that loss aversion can be neutralized by 
framing situations in a way that exploits individuals’ optimism bias. 
29
 Similarly, in a situation where two or more biases offset each other so that the behavior is nearly optimal, a social 
planner engaging in AEP would encourage correcting only one bias even if this meant a reduction of welfare in the 
short run (see Besharov, 2004). 
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vention at time t+0, the individuals might unlearn the capacity to engage in effective self-
regulation. Self-regulation can be improved through regular exercise (Baumeister et al., 2006), and 
the described intervention may remove such opportunities. The intervention in period t+0 may thus 
even increase the present-bias over time so that β is reduced to β’ (β’ < β). Assume that in a new 
decision context at time t+1, no behaviorally informed policies are present anymore that could uti-
lize the individuals’ distorted perceptions to reduce unhealthy consumption. In this situation, the 
consumption of the unhealthy good satisfies vx(x’; αρρ) – β’cx(x’; αγγ) - 1 = 0. Hence, the con-
sumption of the unhealthy good in the new decision-making context might be even higher than 
without having been exposed to the behaviorally informed policy in the first place (i.e. x’ > x*).30 
This example illustrates that when acknowledging dynamic effects, even well-motivated behavior-
al interventions can be detrimental for individuals’ well-being. This is, however, only true when 
the interventions try to change the outcomes of decision-making without influencing the reasons 
for decision-making anomalies. This type of intervention is similar to curing the symptoms of a 
sickness without looking at the underlying reasons of the sickness.  
 
Alternatively, assume that the policy-maker engages in AEP and tries to reduce individuals’ ten-
dency to impulsively pursue immediate gratification and thereby bring β to unity. To do so the pol-
icy-maker can try to (i) reduce the present-bias in System 1, and (ii) activate System 2. To reduce 
the present-bias the policy-maker can, for example, encourage individuals to choose smaller plates 
(Wansink and Cheney, 2005), and to adopt an abstract mindset or imagine tempting stimuli in a 
non-consummatory fashion, which both reduces temptations (Hofmann et al., 2010). The policy-
maker can also make individuals aware of their present-bias and provide an understanding of the 
bias’ origins. The policy-maker can transfer the knowledge about factors that can lead to impulsive 
behavior, such as fatigue (Baumeister et al., 1998), cognitive load (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999), 
visceral states such as hunger and thirst (Loewenstein, 1996), and being exposed to many attractive 
cues (Lades, 2012). Increased awareness and understanding of these factors allow individuals to 
effectively modify their own decision-making contexts and thus to engage in self-nudging (see 
Lades, 2014). To activate System 2 and encourage deliberative decision-making policy-makers 
can, for example, prompt individuals to make decisions well in advance (Rogers and Bazerman, 
2008), provide pre-commitment mechanisms (Bryan et al., 2010), induce a higher construal level 
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 Whether behavioral interventions can increase decision-making anomalies over time, however, is essentially an 
empirical question worth pursuing in future research (see also de Haan and Linde, 2012).  
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thinking rather than lower level thinking (Trope and Liberman, 2003), and make people accounta-
ble for their decisions.
31
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Individuals can make mistakes and these can turn out to be welfare-decreasing for them. While not 
all departures from rational choice theory might necessarily mean lower well-being (e.g., Schwartz 
et al., 2002), there are enough instances of systematic non-optimal behavior. In this respect, behav-
ioral economists are right in claiming that there is scope for paternalism (however defined). In the 
present paper, we have argued that soft paternalism, as exemplified by the idea of libertarian pater-
nalism, has a major shortcoming in that it neglects the fact that behavioral interventions may re-
duce the individual capability to make critically reflected, autonomous decisions and that this be-
comes particularly pressing when considering the dynamic effects of behavioral interventions. 
 
To remedy this shortcoming the paper has sketched a notion of “autonomy-enhancing paternalism” 
(AEP). In line with Dworkin (1988) and in the language of Kahneman (2011), we define autonomy 
as the possibility to make critically reflected decisions in System 2. Behavioral policy interventions 
that are in line with AEP aim to increase individual welfare over time by changing the choice ar-
chitecture to facilitate individuals’ ability to make critically reflected decisions. Interventions that 
enhance autonomy, but do not increase welfare cannot be justified within AEP as these interven-
tions are not paternalistic. Also paternalistic interventions that have positive short-run effects on 
individual well-being, but reduce autonomy cannot be justified within AEP. Making people better 
off at the expense of their autonomy (especially through manipulative nudges of which people are 
not aware) risks “infantilizing” consumers (Barber, 2008) and is morally undesirable. While liber-
tarian paternalism seems to approve of interventions that induce individuals to do the right thing 
for the wrong reasons, AEP insists on interventions that help individuals doing the right thing for 
the right (unbiased) reasons. AEP thus takes seriously the idea of sovereign citizens, renders ma-
nipulation impossible, accounts for the heterogeneity of individuals, and counteracts slippery slope 
arguments by decreasing the probability of future paternalistic interventions. Most importantly, 
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 Not all of these ways of reducing present-bias change the context in which decisions are made. Some of the men-
tioned interventions aim to educate the individuals, train them, and generate awareness and understanding (Soll et al., 
2013). 
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AEP highlights the importance of autonomy in a dynamic framework, where policy interventions 
can shape preferences and the strength of decision anomalies over time. Interventions that do not 
enhance, or even reduce, individual autonomy can increase individuals’ cognitive biases and in-
duce unwanted preference learning paths (Binder, 2014). In our view, soft paternalism should mod-
ify decision contexts to help individuals to overcome their biases and decision-making fallibilities 
over time and thus encourage them to make better, autonomous choices. 
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